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NOTES
INJURIA NON EXCUSAT INJURIAM:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL INJUNCTIONS AND THE
DUTY TO OBEY
The contempt power is understandable when seen through the
perspectives of its age of inception, an age of alleged divinely-ordained
monarchies, ruled by a king totally invested with all sovereign legal
powers and accountable only to God. Under any circumstances
resistance to the king was a sin which would bring damanation.
Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt Power, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q.
1,7.
.4n injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with
equity powers upon pleadings properly invoking its action, and served
upon persons made parties therein and within the jurisdiction, must be
obeyed by them however erroneous the action of the court may be, even
if the error be in the assumption of the validity of a seeming but void
law going to the merits of the case. It is for the court of first instance
to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision
is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher
court, its orders based on its decision are to be respected, and
disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished.
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922) [cited with approval in
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307,314 (1967].
In 1967 the Supreme Court in Walker v. City of Birmingham'
affirmed criminal contempt convictions of the late Dr. Martin Luther
King and several of his followers2 for intentional violation of an
Alabama Circuit Court's ex parte temporary injunction, ordering the
petitioners to refrain from participating in several scheduled Easter
weekend protest marches.3 In affirming, the Court refused to permit a
collateral attack on first amendment grounds against either the
injunction or the municipal permit ordinance which it incorporated., In
1 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
2 The petitioners in Walker were eight Negro ministers, including King, Ralph Abernathy, and
I-red Shuttlesworth. See id. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3 The injunction, set out in full in Appendix A of Walker, id. at 321-22, did little more than
incorporate the text of the Birmingham parade ordinance. See Walker v. City of Birmingham,
388 U S 307, 327 (1967) (Douglas, J.) (dissenting).
4. It shall be unlawful to organize or hold, or to assist in organizing or holding, or to
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1968, the Court, in Carroll v. President & Commissioners of Princess
Anne,s reversed a Maryland circuit court's ex parte restraining order
issued against members of a "white supremacist" organization,
holding that no ex parte order is valid if an adversary hearing on the
issue of interim restraint of first amendment privileges is practicable.
The Walker decision has been severely criticized, 7 particularly in light
of the Court's decision in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,8 which
held the ordinance in question in Walker void on its face. The Court's
subsequent decision in Carroll mandates, however, that ex parte
injunctions such as issued in Walker are no longer ordinarily
acceptable in first amendment litigation. Nonetheless, the question
remains whether Walker would deny assertion of first amendment
defenses in contempt proceedings for violation of an overbroad
injunction issued after an adversary contest. It is the purpose of this
note to explore this issue, particularly in light of a suggested re-
evaluation of the Walker opinion.
take part or participate in, any parade or procession or other public demonstration on the
streets or other public ways of the city, unless a permit therefor has been secured from
the commission.
To secure such permit, written application shall be made to the commission, setting forth
the probable number of persons, vehicles and animals which will be engaged in such
parade, procession or other public demonstration, the purpose for which it is to be held
or had, and the streets or other public ways over, along or in which it is desired to have
or hold such parade, procession or other public demonstration. The commission shall grant
a written permit for such parade, procession or other public demonstration, prescribing
the streets or other public ways which may be used therefor, unless in its judgment the
public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require
that it be refused. It shall be unlawful to use for such purposes any other streets or public
ways than those set out in said permit.
The two preceding paragraphs, however, shall not apply to funeral processions.
BIRMINGHAM, ALA., CODE § 1159 (1944).
5. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
6. There is a place in our jurisprudence for exparte issuance, without notice, of temporary
restraining orders of short duration; but there is no place within the area of basic freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment for such orders where no showing is made that it is
impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to
participate.
Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Ann&, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968). See Monaghan, First
Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARv. L. REV. 518, 536 (1970).
7. See, e.g., Selig, Regulation of Street Demonstrations by Injunction: Constitutional
Limitations on the Collateral Bar Rule in Prosecutions for Contempt, 4 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv.
LIB. L. REV. 135 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Selig]; Comment, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 517 (1968);
Comment, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HARV. L. REV. 626, 633 (1970); Comment, The
Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 141 (1967); Comment, Constitutional Law-
Procedural Limitations on Defenses Available in Contempt Proceedings, 22 Sw. L.J. 334 (1968);
Comment, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 124 (1967).
8. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
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1. WALKER V. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM
In April of 1963, King and his followers were engaged in a series of
civil rights demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama. Aware that mass
civil rights marches were scheduled for the Easter weekend, city
officials filed a complaint in the Alabama Circuit Court alleging that
the activities were "calculated to provoke breaches of the peace",
"threaten(ed) the safety, peace and tranquility of the City," and placed
"an undue burden and strain upon the manpower of the Police
Department"." The court issued an ex parte injunction of indefinite
duration restraining the petitioners and all those persons with notice of
the order from participating in or encouraging mass street parades or
mass processions without a permit as required by the Birmingham
parade ordinance. 0 Petitioners were served with copies of the court
order early the next morning, which was a day before the first of the
planned demonstrations. Apparently convinced that they would receive
no co-operation or permit from the city, and that the Alabama state
court would be unwilling to reconsider its order in an adversary
proceeding," the Walker petitioners made no effort either to comply
with the Birmingham ordinance or to inform the Circuit Court of what
they believed to be constitutional error. Thus, without first having
made any attempts to co-operate with the local authorities or court,
the petitioners held, in violation of the injunction, marches and
demonstrations over the weekend which were marred by sporadic
violence and property damage.' 2 The following Monday, when the
9. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 309 (1967).
10 See notes 3 & 4, infra.
II. The majority in Walker set forth fully in an appendix the text of petitioner's statement
issued shortly after service of the writ. That statement included the following remarks:
Alabama has made clear its determination to defy the law of the land. Most of its public
officials, its legislative body and many of its law enforcement agents have openly defied
the desegregation decision of the Supreme Court. We would feel morally and legal (sic)
responsible to obey the injunction if the court of Alabama applied equal justice to all of
its citizens. This would be sameness made legal. However, the ussuance (sic) of this
injunction is a blatant difference made legal.
We believe in a system of law based on justice and morality. Out of our great love for
the Constitution of the U.S. and our desire to purify the judicial system of the State of
Alabama. we risk this critical move ..
Walker v City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1967) (Appendix B).
12. The Walker opinions reveal two distinct assessments of the quantity of violence which
occurred Compare Justice Stewart's description: "Some 300 or 400 people from among the
onlookers followed in a crowd that occupied the entire width of the street and overflowed onto
the sidewalks. Violence occurred. Members of the crowd threw rocks that injured a newspaperman
and damaged a police motorcycle.", 388 U.S. 307, 311, with Justice Brennan's: "The participants
DUTY TO OBEY
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petitioners filed a motion to dissolve the injunction, the court held them
in contempt. 3 The Circuit judge refused to consider petitioner's attack
on the constitutionality of both the ordinance and restraining order,
noting that there had been no efforts to either comply with or to vacate
the injunction before it was willfully and deliberately violated. 4
On appeal, petitioners defended their non-compliance by asserting
the invalidity of the parade ordinance and the injunction enforcing it
on the ground that both were vague and overbroad, operating in prior
restraint of a protected speech activity. The Alabama Supreme Court,
upon the authority of Howat v. Kansas,'s held these issues could be
appropriately raised only in a direct attack, and not'collaterally in a
contempt proceeding." The Supreme Court, splitting five to four, 7
affirmed the contempt conviction.
Unfortunately, Justice Stewart's majority opinion is less than
unequivocal. For example, the decision has been severely criticized for
its heavy reliance on the language and authority of Howat, a decision
seemingly inapplicable as precedent and insensitive to the special
procedural safeguards demanded by the Court for first amendment
activities. 8 A closer reading of the Stewart opinion reveals that the
majority opinion utilized Howat only to explain the decision of the
Alabama Supreme Court. This is an important distinction. While the
Court was willing to allow these contempt convictions to rest on
Howat's authority, Walker refuses to accept Howat as an inflexible
rule which will bar all collateral first amendment attacks. The Court
stated its exact holding as follows:
In the present case, however, we are asked to hold that this rule of
in both parades were in every way orderly; the only episode of violence ... was rock throwing
by three onlookers. . . immediately taken into custody by the police." 388 U.S. 307, 341.
Justice Brennan infers in his dissent that the majority's overemphasis of the disruptions
stemmed from their fear of generating a rule of law which would sanction riots and civil
disobedience. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 349 (1967). It is equally plausible
that the majority credited the disorder to the unwillingness of the petitioners to seek a modified
court order regulating both the police and demonstrators' conduct. Cf. Williams v. Wallace, 240
F. Supp. 100 (D.C. Ala. 1965) (Selma-Montgomery march); City of Chicago v. King, 86 II1. App.
2d 340, 230 N.E.2d 41 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028 (1968); City of Louisville v. King, 12
Race Rel. L. Rep. 673 (Cir. Ct. Ky. 1967).
13. The sentence was five days in jail and a $50 fine, the maximum under the contempt statute.
See ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 143 (1958).
14. See Valker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1967).
15. 258 U.S. 181 (1922).
16. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 279 Ala. 53, 181 So. 2d 493 (1965).
17. Dissenting were the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan, Fortas, and Douglas.
18. See generally Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARv. L. REv. 518 (1970);
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
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law, upon which the Alabama court relied, [Howat] was constitutionally
impermissable. We are asked to say that the Constitution compelled
Alabama to allow the petitioners to violate this injunction . . . without
any previous effort on their part to have the injunction dissolved or
modified, or any attempt to secure a parade permit, in accordance with
its terms. Whatever the limits of Howat v. Kansas, [footnote; In re
Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1963)] we cannot accept the petitioners'
contentions in the circumstances of this case.19
Therefore, Walker holds technically that Howat was an acceptable
precedent to sustain the contempt conviction, despite first amendment
challenges, under the circumstances of the case presented. Perhaps
designedly, the Walker opinion did not foreclose the question whether
the defendants might have permissibly raised the invalidity of the
ordinance or injunction if the Alabama Circuit Court had refused to
modify or dissolve its order after the petitioners had co-operatively and
respectifully informed the court of its error and sought reasonable
alternatives.
II. CRITICISM AND DISMAY OVER WALKER
Legal commentary on Walker has not generally read that decision
narrowly.2 The absence of such consideration may flow from the
voting split of the Court, with the 'liberal' defenders of first
amendment activity in dissent. However, it is perplexing that general
commentary on the decision has imputed unhesitantly to the Justices
in the majority a willingness to fashion a tool for the indiscriminate
injunctive suppression of free expression. In any event, the basic
"collateral bar" rule thought to eminate from Walker is:
An erroneous injunction impermissably infringing First Amendment
19. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967). In addition to the In re Green
limitation, the Court noted that Walker "is not a case where the injunction was transparently
invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity." Id. at 315. The Court also declined to decide
whether the parade ordinance was void on its face or whether the injunction suffered from
overbreadth. Id. at 317. The California Supreme Court has read through this refusal an additional
limitation. See In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968). The difficulty
with these supposed "limitations" is that the Court made no attempt to explain them and the
commentators have had difficulty breathing life into them. See, e.g., Comment, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
517,521 (1968).
20. But see Comment. 56 CALIF. L. REV. 517, 521-22 (1968). At least one article has discounted
the possibility of a reversal in Walker had petitioners sought modification of the injunction prior
to its violation by noting that the Court cited no authority supporting such a principle. This
conclusion overlooks both the express language of the Walker opinion and its citation to In re
Green, 369 U S 689 (1963). See Comment, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HARV. L. REv.
626, 635 n.54 (1970).
DUTY TO OBEY
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freedoms issued by a court with proper jurisdiction must be obeyed until
reversed by the issuing court or on direct appeal, and is not subject to a
collateral constitutional attack in a contempt proceeding following its
violation.2
This construction of Walker subjects itself automatically to
numerous and substantial objections. First, the "collateral bar" rule
forces a destructive delay in relief from an erroneous ruling. Especially
in political speech activity, timeliness has consistently been recognized
as crucial. "It is vital to the operation of democratic government that
the citizens have facts and ideas on important issues before them. A
delay of even a day or two may be of crucial importance in some
instances." 2 Obviously, an inflexible "collateral bar" rule envisages
both the delay and expenses of a direct attack on appeal far in excess
of that which even unsympathetic state officials may deem necessary
to quash the expected impact of unwanted local demonstrations. 3
Likewise, the rule would seemingly permit local authorities to acquire
"eleventh hour" injunctions which would in effect stifle all possibility
of attack on the injunction because of the insufficient time remaining
for adequate preparation to resist in the trial court or through an
expedited appeal .24
The Walker majority attempted to dissipate contentions of
unconstitutional delay by noting that Alabama provided an expedited
21. See e.g., Selig; Comment, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 141
(1967). But see In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968); City of
Chicago v. King, 86 111. App. 2d 340, 230 N.E.2d41 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028 (1968).
22. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) cited
with approval in Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968);
cf. Lovell v. Giiffin, 303 U.S. 444,452 (1937); In re Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,733 (1877).
23. The degree of success of dilatory tactics may depend upon the form of the injunction. If
the body of the injunction contains both (1) a reference to the underlying ordinance or statute
and (2) the substantially complete text of the enactment, it would seem that if the injunction and
the ordinance are facially void, this will appear on the face of the injunction. Whether this is true
when only one of the above elements is incorporated into the injunction is doubtful. An injunction
which merely prohibits first amendment activity and enjoins violation of a certain section of the
municipal code, without more, may be void as a prior restraint; but unless the injunction also
contains the text of the legislation, the facial voidness of the latter will not be apparent. In such a
case, the question on direct review could be limited solely to the validity of the injunction. A
successful litigant would then conclude the first attack, possibly after extended appellate review,
in precisely the same position in which he began. A second, equally time-consuming process
would be required to destroy the statute or ordinance as well.
24. See e.g., Comment, Collateral Attack upon Labor Injunctions Issued in Disregard of Anti-
Injunction Statutes, 47 YALE L.J. 1136, 1144 (1938); cf., Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY
347 (1950).
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process of appellate review.2? To the extent that this reference limits the
Walker holding, the Court clearly departs from the Howat precedent.
Moreover, the Court neglected to note that the expedited appeal
procedure would still have extended litigation beyond Easter Sunday
and prevented the protest at its scheduled time.26 The burden of delay
created by a direct appeal perhaps takes a back seat to the threat of
enormous expense, even in an expedited appeal. The state or federal
government might, on the other hand, be obligated to supply appointed
counsel and to assume the expenses of appeal in a collateral contempt
proceeding. Of course, the value of an appointed counsel would
diminish significantly if the demonstrator were estopped from raising
constitutional defenses.
Whatever alternative federal remedies might provide relief from a
state court injunction in a particular case, such as injunction before
proceedings instituted, Dombrowski v. Pfister,27 after suit filed,
Machesky v. Bizzell,28 or declaratory relief, Zwickler v. Kooia,2
stifling delay and expense would still seem relatively certain. If Walker
meant to require such hardships, the Court offered no explanation why
the balanced interest of the state court's dignity versus first amendment
freedom demands so much.?
Second, this "collateral bar" rule offers a strong incentive to local
officials to suppress unwanted protests and acts as a "chilling effect"
on the exercise of the first amendment rights. It is significant to note
that the duty of obedience under Walker is not limited to injunction
prohibiting violations of statutes or ordinances, but will apply equally
to an order restraining first amendment activities not prohibited by
statute.3' It would seem that local officials eager to collar civil rights
or student demonstrators, but unassisted by the state legislature, will
soon discover the Walker injunction a powerful club, easily reshaped
for indiscriminate use. 32 Indeed, a discriminatory injunction may be far
25. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 319 (1967).
26. See ALA CODE tit. 7, Sup. Ct. Rules (1951).
27. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
28. 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969).
29. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
30. See generally Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
31 See City of Chicago v. King, 86 I11. App. 2d 340, 230 N.E.2d 41 (1967), cert. denied, 393
U.S 1028 (1968).
32 Cf, Brief for Appellants at 30 n. 15, Fields v. City of Fairfield, 375 U.S. 248 (1963)
(detailed history of cases involving discriminatory local suppression of speech activities);
Nicmotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
DUTY TO OBEY
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less difficult to obtain than an overbroad ordinance, the latter
presumably requiring the combined shortsightedness or prejudice of
several lawmakers rather than one vindictive jurist. This analysis
quickly reveals that the underlying theory to the "collateral bar"
rule-undoubting respect for the judiciary-threatens to permit
profitable and unrestrained disrespect by the judiciary of the
Constitution, when personal motives override judicial neutrality.
Finally, elevation of the Walker injunction above the protective
shield of the Constitution logically must have the same "chilling
effect" which the Court has thought present in vague and overbroad
free speech regulatory statutes. 33 In short, Walker v. City of
Birmingham, read as a judicial off-spring of the broad rule stated in
Howat v. Kansas appears incoisistent and insensitive to a long line of
Court decisions erecting special procedural safeguards against
discriminatory suppression of first amendment activity.
It should be obvious that the dismay expressed over these potent
dangers rests on the premise that the prosecutors and judiciary may be
corruptable and prejudiced; and moreover, that this prejudice may
receive priority by those officials over the obligations of their office and
to the Constitution. Absent this premise, there is no reason to presume
that an informed court will deliberately confront demonstrators with a
repressive, unconstitutional injunction. 4 While it might be forcefully
argued that the conduct of the trial court in Walker illustrates the
accuracy of the premise, it is clear that the Supreme Court has been
traditionally unwilling in other civil rights contexts to presume that the
state judiciary will not enforce the Constitution even-handedly and
accurately.3 In this regard it is significant that there are two equally
strong inferences which may be drawn from the circuit court's issuance
of the overbroad ex parte injunction in Walker. First, it may be
inferred that the judge in the ex parte proceeding heard only evidence
33. See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 80-81 (1930); Selig at
142. "This injunction was such potent magic that it transformed the command of an
unconstitutional statute into an impregnable barrier. . . entirely superior. . . to even the United
States Constitution." Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 330 (1967) (Warren, Ch. J.,
dissenting).
34. See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (D.C. Ata. 1965); cf. City of Chicago v. King,
86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 230 N.E.2d 41 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1028 (1968).
35. See. e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808 (1966); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941).
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self-serving to the interests of the complainants, and that he remained
otherwise uninformed of the relevant law and facts.36 The decision in
Walker, clarified by Carroll, suggests that the petitioners, by their
resolute distrust of the local court and consequent refusal to co-operate
or even appear before the circuit court, failed to diminish the possibility
of the second inference and therefore were unentitled to the benefit of
the first as a part of their defense in the contempt proceeding. In short,
Walker can be sensibly read to deny the shelter of first amendment
defenses in contempt proceedings for violation of a court order only
where a defendant's unreasonable refusal to seek protection of his first
amendment privilege before the issuing court invited the error sought
to be asserted .3 This would limit the Walker precedent, except in the
unusual case of default, to the ex parte proceeding, now antiquated for
first amendment adjudication. The opinion in Walker will, of course,
still be influential in assessing the continued vitality of Howat as an
absolute bar of collateral defenses.
III. PRIOR FEDERAL DECISIONS
The Court in Walker sustained the Alabama Supreme Court's
reliance on Howat v. Kansas in part by stating that contemporary
lower federal decisions had adopted a parallel collateral bar for their
general administration of contempt.3 This aura of precedent in the
federal court system is unduly misleading. Quite obviously, Walker
involved a direct clash between the mandates of the first amendment
and the power of contempt-and was not a questio-n of general
administration. Only one of the cases cited by the Court in its lengthy
footnote even considered the sensitive issue raised in Walker and,
moreover, Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.,3' the origin of
the federal collateral bar rule, seemingly countenanced some
constitutional defenses.
36. In the absence of evidence and argument offered by both sides and of their
participation in the formulation of value judgments, there is insufficient assurance of the
balanced analysis and careful conclusions which are essential in the area of First
Amendment adjudication.
The same is true of the fashioning of the order.
Carroll v President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
37 City of Chicago v. King, 86 Il. App.2d 340, 230 N.E.2d 41 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1028 (1968)
38 Nine federal and five Supreme Court decisions are cited. See Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967).
39 205 F. 857 (2ndCir. 1913).
DUTY TO OBEY
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Brougham was a part of the legal aftermath of the Titanic disaster.
Following the sinking of the ship, Oceanic, an English corporation,
sought to limit its liability in the United States under some protective
federal statutes, and as part of its protection, was granted an injunction
by the Southern District of New York restraining the commencement
and prosecution of suits predicated on the disaster. Brougham, an
attorney, filed as personal representative an action for wrongful death.
For this conduct he was held in contempt for violating the injunction.
Affirming the conviction, the Second Circuit stated:
The injunction having been issued by the District Court within its
jurisdiction and the plaintiff in error having disobeyed it, he was . . .
properly adjudged in contempt. We find nothing in the contentions made
in his behalf . . . to excuse him. We are satisfied that he acted with
sufficient knowledge; . . . and that no constitutional right of his client
justified his disobedience.10
The exact meaning of the last sentence in the above extract is not
without ambiguity. It certainly does not lend ready support to an
absolute collateral bar of first amendment defenses of the defendant in
a contempt proceeding.
Walker cited only one decision, Kasper v. Brittain," involving
alleged first amendment defenses to a contempt citation. In Kasper, the
Sixth Circuit applied the Howat collateral bar rule to uphold the
contempt conviction of a race agitator whose inflamatory speeches
against desegregation in violation of an ex parte temporary injunction
had led to violence. Although the opinion recites the "absolute"
language of Howat, the Court of Appeals permitted the defendant'to
assert a first amendment defense and held that his speech, constituting
a clear and present danger, was not entitled to first amendment
protection. It was only after this finding that the court cited Howat to
support affirmation of the conviction." Because the defendant's
speeches in Kasper. were not of a privileged first amendment variety,
the court may have heard the constitutional defense in form only-so
as to "cover all the bases." Thus Kasper, like Brougham and the cases
following it cited by the Court, are ambigious and simply do not assist
in an evaluation, clarification or support of Walker.
40. Id. at 861.
41. 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957).
42. Cf. Ford v. Boeger, 362 F.2d 999 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 914 (1966) (flrst
amendment defense considered); In re Block, 50 N.J. 494, 236 A.2d 589 (1967); Comment, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 517 (1968).
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V. CARROLL V. PRESIDENT & COMMISSIONERS OF PRINCESS ANNE.
On the evening of August 6, 1966, the National States Rights Party,
a "white supremacist" organization, held a militant, provocative rally
directed against Negroes and Jews. The atmosphere of the meeting was
tense, and city and county officials, fearing outbreaks of racial violence
at the next evening's scheduled assembly, obtained an ex parte, ten day
restraining order from the local county circuit court. The order
enjoined the organization from holding meetings "which will tend to
disturb and endanger the citizens of the County.' 43 No notice of the
proceeding was given, or apparently attempted to be given, to the
members of the organization until after the order was issued.
Complying with the order, the scheduled meeting was cancelled. At a
trial held after the expiration of the ten day order, the circuit court
extended the substance of the ten day order for another ten months.
Without violating either order, the "Party" appealed to the Maryland
Court of Appeals, where the ten month order was vacated, but the
original ex parte order affirmed. On a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court, the ex parte order was set aside, the Court holding that no ex
parte order is valid if an adversary hearing on the issue of restraint of
first amendment privileges is practicable." The respondents in Carroll
argued that since the order had expired, the case was moot and should
be dismissed without reaching the merits. In rejecting this contention,
the Court made clear that it considered it particularly appropriate to
decide the case in view of its decision in Walker.15 In this respect, the
Court observed that the petitioners had ". . . pursued the course
indicated by Walker." The Court stated that this compliance by the
Carroll petitioners was "... to seek judicial review of the injunction
and not to disobey it . .I.'.- This subtle statement of course does
nothing to clarify Walker. "Compliance" by seeking "judicial review"
43. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 177 (1968).
44 We need not here decide that it is impossible for circumstances to arise in which the
issuance of an ex parte restraining order for a minimum period could be justified because
of the unavailability of the adverse parties or their counsel . . . (l)n the present case, it is
clear that the failure to give notice, formal or informal, and to provide an opportunity
for an adversary proceeding before the holding of the rally was restrained, is incompatable
with the First Amendment.
ld. at 184-85.
45. Id at 179.
46. The proper procedure, it was held, was to seek judicial review of the injunction and
not to disobey it... Petitioners have pursued the course indicated by Walker . ...
Id. at 179.
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of an ex parte order could mean as little as filing a motion to dissolve
or as much as carrying an appeal to the Supreme Court. Petitioners
in Carroll did both, and in addition, indicated a willingness to
cooperate with the local court rather than hold it in disdain.47 Because
the petitioners in Carroll exhausted all available appellate procedures
rather than violating the ten day order, it can certainly be argued that
Carroll and Walker require an absolute bar to a constitutional defense
in a contempt proceeding, unless those under restraint seek relief solely
through appeal. The difficulty with this interpretation is that it is
seemingly out of step with the otherwise sensitive approach to the First
Amendment expressed by the Court, and as such, should not be readily
accepted.
Ordinarily, the State's constitutionally permissible interests are
adequately served by criminal penalties imposed after freedom to speak
has been so grossly abused that its immunity is breached. The impact
and consequences of subsequent punishment for such abuse are
materially different from those of prior restraint. Prior restraint upon
speech suppresses the precise freedom which the First Amendment
sought to protect against abridgment.
The Court has emphasized that "[a] system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity". .48
The conveniently cross-referenced reasoning of Carroll to Walker
suggests that the Court, perhaps in response to the criticism drawn by
Walker, is unwilling to foreclose the future opportunity of a narrow
reading.
Justice Fortas' majority opinion in Carroll submits'two primary
reasons for the Court's rejection of ex parte first amendment
adjudication. First, he posits that the ex parte injunction interferes with
the timely exercise of protected political speech, where a delay of "...
even a day or two may be of crucial importance in some instances."
Second, Justice Fortas flatly states that non-adversarial first
amendment adjudication "... reduces the possibility of a narrowly
drawn order, and substantially imperils the protection which the [First]
Amendment seeks to assure." These dual propositions tendered by the
47. See note 11, supra. "
48. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180-81 (1968).
49. Id. at 182.
50. Id. at 184. The Court emphasized particularly the dangers of judicial reliance on the
versions of events and dangers presented by the prosecuting officials, because of their "special
interest."
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Carroll Court to support its holding are pertinent, however, only if it
is first conceded that Walker would permit collateral constitutional
defenses in subsequent contempt proceedings following the violation of
an ex parte injunction if the petitioners had in a co-operative spirit
appeared before the court to inform the court of its error and seek
alternative solutions without avail. For example, Carroll posits that the
ex parte injunction, unlike injunctions following an adversary contest,
can obstruct the timely exercise of political expression. Demonstrators
confronted with an unconstitutionally vague injunction issued following
an adversary hearing likewise have no guarantee of timely exercise if
they too are inflexibly required to attack the injunction only by a direct
appeal. For the emphasis on timeliness to acquire meaning in Carroll,
therefore, one of two possible premises must be accepted. It must be
assumed that demonstrators will, if necessary for a timely expression,
violate the order in complete disregard of the absolute certainty of
conviction for contempt or that the collateral bar rule is not absolute
in first amendment adjudication. The second of the alternatives is a
necessary choice by common sense alone.51
By conceding that there are inherent difficulties in shaping a
constitutionally precise injunction in ex parte litigation, the Court in
Carroll confirms that two inferences should be drawn from the issuance
of a faulty ex parte injunction. 52 However, Carroll asserts that active
participation by all interested parties on a petition to enjoin speech
activities significantly reduces the probability that a trial court has
unintentionally issued a suppressive decree. Thus, the inference that the
overbroad injunction is the by-product of a procedurally deficient ex
parte hearing, is substantially weakened. Moreover, active participation
negates the inference of invited error.53 Under this analysis, limiting
challenges of an erroneous ruling solely to appeal, rather than by a
defensible violation, can no longer be strongly supported. Certainly
when required pursuit of relief solely by appeal will frustrate timely
exercise of the protected activity, chill by expense and dilatory tactics
the desire to engage in political expression, and provide a vicious tool
for indiscriminate suppression to a powerful minority, *respect for the
first amendment ought to receive priority over the orderliness of direct
appeals. This is, as will be seen, the rationale of In re Green as
distinguished from Howat by the Walker Court.
51 Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. See note 31, supra and accompanying text.
53. See City of Chicago v. King, 86 I11. App. 2d 340, 230 N.E.2d 41, 48 (1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S 1028 (1968).
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IV. HOWAT V. KANSAS & IN RE GREEN
In 1920, following an economically disasterous coal miner's strike,
Kansas passed the Industrial Court Act, requiring compulsory
arbitration to prevent strikes in critical industries. Two years later coal
strikes again threatened, and an injunction was obtained to prevent
shutdowns while an industrial board investigated alleged grievances.
Arguing that the Industrial Act was unconstitutional, 4 and therefore
that the court was without jurisdiction to compel obedience by
injunction, the miners ignored the order. The criminal contempt
conviction which followed was upheld by the Kansas Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court dismissed a writ of error from that decision for
want of a substantial federal question, framing an apparently absolute
"collateral bar" rule (set out in full in the introduction) for the
presentation of a constitutional defense.55 Immediately following
Howat's recitation of the general doctrine is a qualifying paragraph
unmentioned in Walker. The Court found that the injunction was not
issued to enforce the Industrial Courts *Act" but rather ". . . was a
proceeding wholly independent of that Act, and the district court, in
entertaining it, did not depend on the constitutionality of that act for
its jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of its order." 7 Thus, Howat did not
decide whether a constitutional attack was permissable in contempt
proceedings for violation of an injunction issued solely on the authority
of an unconstitutional statute. That issue was for the first time reached
in Walker.
In Walker, while the circuit court's order included extracts of the
parade ordinance, declared subsequently unconstitutional in
Shuttlesworth, 8 it is clear that the trial court could have issued
originally, or by amendment, a narrowly drawn injunction designed to
prevent violence, etc. without reliance on enforcement of the overbroad
54. The first amendment was not one ofthe grounds asserted.
55. Compare the Howat rule with Mr. Justice Black's dissenting statement in Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1915): "1 understand that people in authoritarian countries must obey
arbitrary orders. I had hoped that there was no such duty in the United States." Id. at 327-28.
Justice Black was in the Walker majority.
56. The injunction issued on the grounds that the "proposed strike was a conspiracy to stop
the railroads, and . . . institutions, and industries of the state in the conduct of its government
affairs, and to cut off the supply of coal . . .; that all said acts would seriously affect and injure
the public welfare and the public health of the people." Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 187
(1922).
57. Id. at 190.
58. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
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ordinance." Thus, if the trial court had been unwilling in Walker to
attempt a construction of the ordinance without appellate guidance, but
nevertheless was aware of the substantial constitutional issues raised by
enforcement of the ordinance," the court had as an available option the
power to issue a protective injunction free from the ordinance's taint."
However, any judicial attempt to shape a narrow injunction,
independent of an overbroad permit ordinance, which would balance
the interests of the state and demonstrators, itself seems
constitutionally hazardous in an ex parte proceeding. Accepting for a
moment the realities of an Alabama circuit court judgeship, it seems
relatively safe to conclude that a judge may well be, perhaps by
political necessity, unsympathetic to civil rights activists. These
sympathies, coupled with the self-serving presentation of the state's
case in an ex parte proceedings62 and the "inescapably imprecise"",
first amendment legal standards, represents a fertile ground for
overbroad restraining orders. It does not mean, however, that the judge
will automatically permit his personal value judgments to override
constitutional mandates and alternatives (such as that suggested above)
where the facts and law are adequately argued and evaluated in an
adversary proceeding." On the contrary, a party's deliberate refusal to
inform the court of its error in its original order, and to submit
alternative proposals to protect each party's interests (especially where
there is sufficient time to do at least that), 5 bypasses all orderly judicial
review and abandons all respect for the judiciary. Under these
circumstances of contemptuous behavior, if not actual contempt, an
estoppel of invited constitutional defenses in a collateral contempt
proceeding is clearly something far short of the absolute collateral bar
postulated in Howat. Rather, the estoppel would rest on the
proposition that contemptuous violation of a court injunction can not
be justified on errors invited by an unreasonable refusal to appear and
59. Cf City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d. 340, 230 N.E.2d 41 (1967), cert. denied, 393
U S 1028 (1968).
60. Cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 316 (1967).
61. Cf United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906) (alternative holding).
62 See note 44, supra.
63. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
64. In refusing to consider petitioners' constitutional defense to the contempt charges, the
Alabama Circuit Court judge in Walker expressly noted that there had been no motion to dissolve
the injunction. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1967).
65 While the one day interim period in Walker may have prevented adequate preparation for
an appearance to dissolve or modify the injunction, it did not prevent an appearance.
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co-operate with the enjoining court. Walker did not deny that Howat
was subject to limitation in first amendment adjudication-on the
contrary, it suggested that there was a limitation. The question is what
limitations the Court is or will be inclined to sanction as inroads on
the contempt power. 8 The Court's decision, In re Green,6" apparently
was cited by the Court in Walker as the outer limit.
In Green an Ohio court issued an ex parte injunction restraining
picketing in a labor controversy. Green, the union attorney, promptly
requested the issuing court to vacate its order and to hold a hearing
on the injunction, both requests being denied. Theorizing that the
injunction was a nullity because issued without a hearing and because
federal preemptive legislation had given jurisdiction of the suit
exclusively to the NLRB, Green advised the union to test the injunction
by disobedience. For this conduct, Green was held in contempt and
convicted without a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that the state court should have allowed the claimed
defense that the state was without power to regulate the labor dispute
by injunction. The Court stated, ". . .[A] state court is without power
to hold one in contempt for violating an injunction that the state court
had no power to enter by reason of federal pre-emption." 6" Justices
Harlan and Clark concurred in part and dissented in part. The dissent
was directed at the Court's departure from Howat. They agreed,
however, that the conviction should be set aside because petitioner had
not been permitted to prove an agreement with the issuing judge that
violation of the order was an appropriate procedure to test state court
jurisdiction.
Although the alleged agreement with the issuing court was
considered in Green only in the separate opinions, and the Court did
not expressly rely on Green's attempt to vacate the order before
violating it," the Walker majority, referring to the undefined limitation
of Howat, cited these two factors alone to distinguish the collateral
attack permitted in Green.70 The Court was unanimous in the belief
that Green would have permitted, if applicable, the collateral
66. See generally In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Goldfarb, The History of the Contempt
Power, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
67. 369 U.S. 689 (1962).
68. Id. at 692.
69. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 332 (1967) (Warren, Ch. J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 315. The Court did not suggest that contempt standards were varied in the case for
an attorney.
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constitutional challenge asserted by the petitioners in Walker.
However, Chief Justice Warren, in dissent, indicated that he was unable
to discern why the Court regarded the two facts cited by.the majority
decisive in distinguishing Green, ". . . unless it means to imply that
the petitioners . ..would have been free to violate the court order if
they had first made a motion to dissolve in the trial court. ' 7'
Admittedly, if Walker was intended to be so limited, the Court was
unduly ambiguous in its explanation. As suggested earlier in a different
line of reasoning,72 the implication drawn by the Chief Justice would
restrict the collateral bar rule of Howat, as a safeguard of judicial
integrity and respect, to the particular difficuties of ex parte first
amendment injunctions. Carroll limits Howat's influence even more,
and in general, the scope of permissible defenses in the collateral
contempt proceeding for violation of a "speech" injunction would be
defined by the more tolerant holding in Green.
VI. CONCLUSION
Howat v. Kansas would impose an absolute collateral bar to first
amendment defenses in contempt proceedings for violation of an
erroneous injunction. In re Green recognizes no such collateral bar for
any defenses. Although Green was decided after Howat and could be
read as impliedly overruling that decision. Walker v. City of
Birmingham, by distinguishing Green, makes it impossible to predict
what the Court will do with those cases in the future. Carroll v.
President & Commissioners of Princess Anne has demonstrated the
Court's awareness of the possible suppression of first amendment rights
through overbroad injunctions. To prevent such infringements, Carroll
requires that the state invite participation in injunction proceedings by
those sought to be restrained. A harmonious reading of Walker,
consistent with both Carroll and the first amendment, would require
no more than a petitioner's acceptance of the Carroll invitation to
prevent a collateral bar. At least until the Court clarifies its position,
the ambiguity of Walker offers the Court room for reanalysis and
narrowing. 3
71. Id. at 332 n. 9.
72. See notes 28-3 1, supra, and accompanying text.
73. It is imperative that, when the effective exercise of these rights is claimed to be
abridged, the courts should 'weigh the circumstances' and 'appraise the substantiality of
the reasons advanced' in support of the challenged regulations.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,96 (1940).
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